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give a dominant role to the doctrine of divine revelation, there is a discernible tendency for this balanced focus to be upset. The theologian’s focus is
displaced, for example, from the fact that God was in Christ reconciling the
world to himself, to what this action reveals about God. Abraham speaks of
“the gracious unveiling of God in the covenant acts and deliverance of Israel from Egypt” (p. 96). To the best of my knowledge, no biblical writer locates God’s grace in the unveiling that occurs in God’s deliverance of Israel
from Egypt; they all locate it in God’s deliverance of Israel from Egypt.
In our relationship to our fellow human beings, such displacement of
focus would often be insulting. I insult you if, instead of responding to
your request for aid, I focus my attention on what your making of this
request reveals about you. Are things different in our relationship to God?

The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism, by Lynne
Rudder Baker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. xv + 253 pp.
WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College
Practical realism, the name given to her position by Lynne Rudder Baker,
is analytic metaphysics with a difference. The difference is stated emphatically by Baker in her concluding summary:
It is time to get on the table an alternative to the dominant metaphysical
theories that accord no ontological significance to things that everyone cares
about—not only concrete objects like one’s car keys, or the Mona Lisa, but
also commonplace states of affairs like being employed next year, or having
enough money for retirement. I believe that such ordinary phenomena are
the stuff of reality, and I have tried to offer a metaphysics that has room in its
ontology for the ordinary things that people value. (p. 240)

Baker’s first chapter is entitled “Beginning in the middle,” a phrase
which carries three distinct though related meanings. We begin with our
actual language, with its embedded picture of the world. We also begin
in the middle epistemologically, aware of our presuppositions but not attempting to eliminate them as Descartes did. And we begin with the medium-sized objects—people, nonhuman organisms, natural objects, artifacts,
and artworks—that are of primary concern to us in our lives. Of particular
importance are “ID phenomena”—objects, properties, and events that are
“intention-dependent,” in that their existence depends on the existence of
persons with propositional attitudes. Unlike a number of other metaphysical views, Baker’s approach takes ID phenomena with utmost seriousness
and refuses to relegate them to second-class ontological status.
The agenda thus established is pursued in part I, “Everyday Things.”
Chapter 2 argues for the reality and non-reducibility of ordinary things,
a theme which continues in chapter 3 on artifacts, to which Baker (unlike
many others from Aristotle on down) accords full ontological status. Any
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view of this sort has to deal with the problem of material constitution. A
piece of cloth is colored and sewn in a certain way, and is made into a flag.
So now we have a flag, but the piece of cloth is still there. And the cloth
and the flag are not identical; the cloth existed before the flag, and could
survive the flag’s demise (for instance, if the flag’s colors were bleached
out and the cloth used for a different purpose). Sorting all this out has
become a cottage industry for metaphysicians, and Baker’s is one of the
leading brands on offer in the constitution market-place. Chapter 4 summarizes and also amplifies the constitution view of persons first expounded in Baker’s earlier Persons and Bodies. On this view, human persons are
constituted by their bodies but not identical with those bodies. She argues
that the constitution view is superior to animalism (the view that persons
are identical with their bodies) in that it holds persons to be ontologically
unique, and superior to substance dualism in affirming “quasi-naturalism,” according to which “human persons are wholly part of the natural
world, produced and governed by natural processes” (p. 87).
Part II, “The Everyday World,” begins with a chapter on causation, in
which she defends nonreductive materialism. She argues carefully and at
length against Jaegwon Kim’s objections to nonreductive mental causation.
Unfortunately, the “property-constitution view” which she advocates still
leaves the Causal-Closure Principle unchallenged; indeed she seems to
regard this as an important merit of her view. She gives no consideration
to the Argument from Reason, which maintains that if causal closure is
accepted (together with other typical materialist assumptions), it becomes
impossible to give an adequate account of the mental life of human beings,
including and especially our practice of logical reasoning.1
In a chapter on vagueness, Baker argues that vagueness is pervasive in
the world and not simply in language; ordinary things typically are vague
both spatially and temporally. She writes, “On my view, the vagueness [of
the spatial boundaries of a dog] is not exhausted by any indeterminacy in
the concept dog. An animal that may have loose hairs is what the concept
dog is a concept of” (pp. 129–130). In the following chapter on time she
rejects both presentism and eternalism and develops a “BA theory” which
offers a “metaphysical account of how the B-series can accommodate an
A-series ongoing now” (p. 150). An important claim of hers is that the Aseries “depends on there being self-conscious entities” (p. 149). Apart from
self-conscious entities, there is no ongoing now, and all events from all
times exist together, related by succession and simultaneity, just as depicted by eternalism. But those self-conscious entities make a difference: “An
event’s occurring now depends on someone’s being judgmentally aware of
it now” (p. 150). This seems to conflict with a truism that she acknowledges, namely that “trivially, every time is now (at that time)” (p. 150). According to this truism, the time of Big Bang was now when it occurred even
1
For an extended discussion of the Argument from Reason, see Victor Reppert, C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003).
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though there were then no self-conscious beings. Apparently, however,
Baker considers this “truism” to be false; she holds, with Adolf Grünbaum,
that “there are past events that were never present” (p. 152). One might
wonder how Baker’s view differs substantively from eternalism. Eternalists certainly recognize that at least for the last couple of million years there
have been self-conscious entities who were aware of its being “now,” and
that for each of these entities there is a temporal A-series comprising times
that are past, present and future. Apparently the difference lies in the fact
that for Baker the A-series facts are genuine truths about the world, rather
than being “merely mind-dependent” (Grünbaum) or entirely fictional
(Mellor). An interesting feature of Baker’s theory is her view that “threedimensional objects move through time, but their doing so depends on
their [sic]2 being self-conscious beings” (p. 152). It follows from this that,
whereas plate tectonics and continental drift went on for billions of years
without the continents moving through time, they suddenly began to do
so with the advent of self-conscious beings. An odd consequence indeed!
Part III, “Metaphysical Underpinnings,” examines selected metaphysical issues that have been passed over in the earlier chapters. In “Constitution revisited” Baker analyzes the constitution relation in depth; in the
process she answers a number of objections and at times revises some of
her earlier views. Unlike some others, she avoids defining constitution in
terms of mereology, but in “Mereology and constitution” she considers
the concepts of mereology and explains how they relate to her notion of
constitution. In another chapter she defends three-dimensionalism against
four-dimensionalism, which presents “the greatest challenge to the constitution view.” The concluding chapter briefly addresses “Five ontological
issues,” namely ontological significance, time and existence, ontological
novelty, ontological levels, and emergence.
Baker’s work on constitution is admirably careful and well-developed,
yet I believe her central and most important example, the constitution of
persons by their bodies, is inadequately defended. To be sure, she goes to
considerable lengths to rebut numerous technical objections to her theory.
What she fails to do, however, is to present a compelling affirmative case
for the theory, one which would show it to be superior to dualism and
animalism. Dualism, in fact, is never taken seriously as an alternative, either in the present volume or in Persons and Bodies. (In both books, Baker is
quite concerned to reassure those who might think her views insufficiently naturalistic; the possibility that they might be overly naturalistic hardly
comes into view.) In The Metaphysics of Everyday Life she says little beyond
the point already noted—that persons are ontologically unique on the constitution view, but not on animalism. In Persons and Bodies she does present
arguments, but they are unconvincing. Some of these arguments concern
matters of value: she writes, “it is an advantage of the Constitution View
2
There is a genuine ambiguity here. Is the passage quoted meant to imply that only selfconscious beings, and not any other objects, move through time? Presumably not, and if not
we should emend ‘their’ to ‘there.’ But this has the odd consequence noted in the text.
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that what is ontologically significant about us grounds what we care about
deeply.”3 Few will dispute with her the importance of being a person, but
it hardly follows from this that human persons, unlike all other animals,
are distinct from their bodies. Some animals, according to her, have “a rudimentary first-person perspective,” yet they remain identical with their
bodies for all that. (According to Baker, a “robust first-person perspective”
is what makes a person a person.) Doesn’t it sound like special pleading
to insist that, while a chimpanzee and a human infant each possesses a
rudimentary first-person perspective, the chimp is identical with its body
while the infant is not? (N. B. I am not arguing for animalism; I am merely
pointing out that Baker does not have good arguments against it.)
Another group of arguments concerns the possibility of replacement
of bodily parts by bionic parts. She writes, “it may be possible for a human person to undergo gradual replacement of her human body by bionic
parts in a way that did not extinguish her first-person perspective; if so,
then she would continue to exist, but she would cease to have a human
body.”4 And if this is possible, then she cannot have been identical with
her body to begin with. I maintain, however, that we have no reason to
think this is possible; we are totally lacking evidence that a nonbiological bionic system could sustain conscious life. But once again, the parallel
with animals defeats her argument. If such gradual replacement is possible for a human being, it is also possible for a cat or a canary, which
on her own view are identical with their respective bodies. Probably the
right thing to say in such cases (should they after all be possible) is that
the body in question still exists but that through the gradual replacement
of parts it has ceased to be a human, or feline, or avian body and has become a bionic body instead. I conclude that while Baker is right about the
importance of the difference between animals and human beings, she has
not justified articulating that difference in terms of the distinction between
constitution and mind-body identity.5
That Baker’s book is subject to objections such as these should not come
as a surprise, and it does little to detract from the book’s overall merits.
Anyone who devises a metaphysical system is bound to expose herself to
a great many objections and disagreements in virtue of the wide range of
topics that must be covered. And while it might seem advantageous to have
answered all the objections in advance, this is incompatible with producing
a book of reasonable length, one that will actually be read. The project of
constructing a metaphysics that takes seriously the sorts of things we are
all concerned with in real life is admirable and important, and Baker carries
it off with distinction. The Metaphysics of Everyday Life is a splendid achievement, one fully deserving of the attention it will undoubtedly receive.
3
Lynne Rudder Baker, Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 227–228.
4
Ibid., 106.
5
For more on Baker’s arguments, see Persons and Bodies; and William Hasker, “The Constitution View of Persons: A Critique,” International Philosophical Quarterly 44.1 (March 2004): 23–34.

